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The ability to integrate the moral intention information with the outcome of an action
plays a crucial role in mature moral judgment. Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies implicated that both prefrontal and temporo-parietal cortices are involved
in moral intention and outcome processing. Here, we used the event-related potentials
(ERPs) technique to investigate the temporal dynamics of the processing of the
integration between intention and outcome information in harmful and helpful moral
judgment. In two experiments, participants were asked to make moral judgments for
agents who produced either negative/neutral outcomes with harmful/neutral intentions
(harmful judgment) or positive/neutral outcomes with helpful/neutral intentions (helpful
judgment). Significant ERP differences between attempted and successful actions over
prefrontal and bilateral temporo-parietal regions were found in both harmful and helpful
moral judgment, which suggest a possible time course of the integration processing in
the brain, starting from the right temporo-parietal area (N180) to the left temporo-parietal
area (N250), then the prefrontal area (FSW) and the right temporo-parietal area (TP450
and TPSW) again. These results highlighted the fast moral intuition reaction and the late
integration processing over the right temporo-parietal area.
Keywords: morality, event-related potential (ERP), integration of intention and outcome, harmful moral judgment,
helpful moral judgment, temporo-parietal junction
INTRODUCTION
The ability to integrate mental states such as intentions with outcome information plays an
important role in moral judgment. People judge attempted harms (e.g., a person who intends
to kill someone but failed) as less permissible and more morally blameworthy than accidental
harms (e.g., a person accidentally kills someone) (Young et al., 2007; Young and Saxe, 2008).
Recently, the integration of intention and outcome in moral judgment has been systematically
investigated (Young et al., 2007, 2011; Young and Saxe, 2008, 2009). In these experiments,
participants read scenarios in a 2 × 2 design: agents produced either a negative or neutral
outcome while intending either the negative outcome (“negative” intention) or the neutral outcome
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(“neutral” intention). Thus, the combination of intention and
outcome yielded four conditions: successful harm, attempted
harm, accidental harm and no harm. Behavioral results of healthy
adults demonstrated a signiﬁcant interaction between intention
and outcome (Young et al., 2007, 2011, 2012). These ﬁndings
reveal that mature moral judgments depend crucially on the
integration processing between an agent’s intention and actual
results of action.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies
investigating the processing of moral intention and outcome
have revealed a network of brain regions, including the medial
prefrontal cortex, precuneus and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)
(Young et al., 2010; Young and Dungan, 2012). However, the
temporal dynamics of this network is still unknown. Particularly,
some studies found right TPJ activation during theory of
mind (TOM), mentalizing and integration processing (Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003; Young et al., 2007, 2010), others reported right
TPJ activation associated with moral intuition (Harenski et al.,
2010). These fMRI ﬁndings implied that right TPJ activation
may be involved in both early moral intuition and late moral
reasoning processing during the integration of intention and
outcome. However, the time course of this integration processing
at right TPJ are poorly understood.
Against this background, the ﬁrst aim of the present study
was to investigate the electrophysiological mechanisms of the
integration between moral intention and outcome using event-
related potentials (ERPs). The measurement of ERPs provides
an excellent method to investigate the temporal features of
information processing in moral cognition due to the high
temporal resolution available from the ERP signal. Previous ERP
studies of moral judgment focused on the interaction between
cognition and emotion in moral processing (Chen et al., 2009;
Sarlo et al., 2012, 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Gui et al., 2015). For
instance, in our previous study, we found the larger N1 for moral
pictures than non-moral pictures, which may reﬂect the early
moral intuition processing without the emotional impact. For
mental states attribution, Proverbio and Riva, 2009; Proverbio
et al., 2010) reported an enhanced posterior negative component
that peaked around 250 ms (N250), which reﬂected the early
recognition of comprehensible behaviors and the early processing
of action’s purpose. Another study further suggested that the
N250 may reﬂect the early cognitive processing to understand
private intention (Wang et al., 2012). During the late time
windows (from 300 to 800 ms), slow wave eﬀects over frontal and
parietal areas were reported to reﬂect speciﬁc cognitive process
of monitoring others’ beliefs (Liu et al., 2009; McCleery et al.,
2011; Geangu et al., 2013). Specially, McCleery et al. (2011)
found a positive component over bilateral temporo-parietal areas
peaking between 400 and 500 ms (TP450) and suggested that
this component could reﬂect the calculating and representing
processes in the visual perspective taking. However, most of
these studies focused only on the mental states reasoning during
the classical TOM tasks, few have investigated the intention
information processing inmoral judgment. So far, only three ERP
studies investigated the neural correlates of moral intention and
valence processing. The results reported signiﬁcant ERP eﬀects
indicating early automatic and late controlled processes (Van
Berkum et al., 2009; Decety and Cacioppo, 2012; Yoder and
Decety, 2014). Decety and Cacioppo (2012) found that people
could distinguish between intentional and accidental harm in as
fast as 62 ms post-stimulus. Van Berkum et al. (2009) reported
a rapid ERP response to the ﬁrst word that indicated a clash
with the reader’s value system within 200 ms. And signiﬁcant
diﬀerences on N1 amplitude between morally good and bad
actions were reported by Yoder and Decety (2014). However,
tasks used in these studies were only related to intention decoding
ormoral valence, and the processing of integrating intention with
outcome information has not been considered yet. Exploring the
time course of integration between intention and outcome may
reveal diﬀerent integration processing stages in moral judgment.
The second aim of the present study was to explore the
cognitive and neural mechanisms of helpful moral judgment.
Helpful behaviors are critically important for human social
development (Graham, 2014; Hofmann et al., 2014). However,
most moral neuroscience studies have concentrated on immoral
and negative behaviors such as killing, murder and harm (Greene
and Haidt, 2002; Young et al., 2007; Greene, 2009; Graham,
2014). Only a few studies have explored the neural processing
during moral judgment of helpful behaviors (Loke et al., 2011;
Young et al., 2011; Paulus et al., 2012; Yoder and Decety,
2014). The neural correlates of helpful intention processing,
especially the integration of helpful intention and outcome in
moral judgment is thus left to be explored. Previous studies have
found that humans respond diﬀerently to negative and positive
information (Baumeister et al., 2001). For instance, when people
make decisions, they typically exhibit greater sensitivity to losses
than to equivalent gains, which is called loss aversion (Tom
et al., 2007). Is there a similar asymmetry between the moral
judgment of good and bad actions? Will the judgments of helpful
behaviors be diﬀerent from the judgment of harmful behaviors?
In order to explore these questions, in addition to harmful moral
processing, positive intention and outcome processing in helpful
moral judgment were also considered in the present study.
Based on previous work, we used ERPs to investigate the
temporal dynamics of the integration processing of intention and
outcome information of harmful and helpful moral judgment in
two experiments. We predicted that: (a) In accord with previous
ﬁndings (Van Berkum et al., 2009; Decety and Cacioppo, 2012;
Yoder and Decety, 2014; Gui et al., 2015), the fast moral intuition
might be revealed by the early ERP eﬀects which are sensitive
to the successful harm and help. Besides, late ERP eﬀects in
accidental and attempted conditions might reﬂect the integration
in late processing stage; (b) According to the fMRI studies which
reported the signiﬁcant activation of right TPJ, left TPJ andmPFC
during the integration of intention and outcome (Koenigs et al.,
2007; Young et al., 2007; Funk and Gazzaniga, 2009; Young
and Dungan, 2012; FeldmanHall et al., 2014), we predicted that
ERP eﬀects would be elicited over frontal and temporo-parietal
electrodes, especially the right TPJ area; (c) The previous fMRI
studies have found similar brain activation in judging harmful vs.
helpful actions (Young et al., 2011). Based on these ﬁndings, we
predicted that the temporal processing stages of the integration
of intention and outcome in harmful and helpful moral judgment
would be similar, which would be shown by similar ERP patterns
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in the current two experiments. However, the interaction eﬀects
between intention and outcome of ERPs would be diﬀerent in
harmful and helpful moral judgment because of the possible
asymmetry between positive and negative processing (Baumeister
et al., 2001).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty-ﬁve undergraduate students from Beijing Normal
University participated in the study. Twenty-seven students (12
males,Mage = 22.8 years, SD = 2.1) participated in Experiment 1
and a diﬀerent group of 28 students (13 males,Mage = 22.4 years,
SD = 1.6) participated in Experiment 2. All participants were
right-handed, with no history of neurological/psychiatric
illness. All the experimental procedures used in Experiments
1 and 2 were approved by the institutional review board
(IRB) of Beijing Normal University (School of Brain and
Cognitive Sciences) and informed written consent was obtained
from each participant in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Stimuli and Experimental Procedures
Stimuli consisted of four variations of 40 harm scenarios selected
from Young’s studies (Young et al., 2010) for experiment 1 and
40 help scenarios selected from a pilot study for Experiment 2
(Figure 1A), for a total of 160 stories for each experiment. In the
pilot study, we wrote 51 help scenarios and asked 25 students
(13 males, Mage = 23, SD = 2.95) to evaluate how much moral
praise the agent deserves for his or her action from 1 (None
at all) to 7 (Very much). 40 scenarios with signiﬁcant rating
diﬀerences (no help, 2.61 ± 0.83; accidental help, 3.77 ± 1.16;
attempted help, 5.23 ± 0.74; successful help, 6.35 ± 0.47) and
high internal consistency (the Chronbach’s alpha: no help: 0.905;
accidental help: 0.960; attempted help: 0.921; successful help:
0.891) were chosen as the materials used in Experiment 2. For
harm scenarios, agents produced either a negative outcome or
a neutral outcome with the intention that they were causing
a negative outcome (“negative” intent) or a neutral outcome
(“neutral” intent). For help scenarios, agents produced either a
positive outcome or a neutral outcome with the intention that
they were causing a positive outcome (“positive” intent) or a
neutral outcome (“neutral” intent). Harmful outcomes referred
to injury to others and helpful outcomes referred to saving others’
lives. Consistent with fMRI studies (Young et al., 2007), each
story consisted of background, foreshadow, intention, action and
outcome segments:
(1) Background: information to set the scene (identical across
conditions)
(2) Foreshadow: information foreshadowing outcome
(valenced or neutral)
(3) Intention: the agent’s intention about the situation (valenced
or neutral)
(4) Action: the agent’s action (identical across conditions)
(5) Outcome: the actual outcome (valenced or neutral)
The experiments were conducted in a dimly lit, sound-proof
room. Participants were seated on a comfortable chair with
their eyes approximately 90 cm away from a 17-in computer
screen. The timeline of a trial was adapted from fMRI studies
(Young et al., 2007, 2011). Intention, action and outcome
segments were separated for the analysis of ERPs time-locked
to the key information (Figure 1B). In each trial, background
and foreshadow information were presented cumulatively until
participants pressed the space key or for a maximum of 10 s.
Then, the intention segment was shown without the keywords
indicating the valence of the agent’s intention. After participants
pressed the space key, the keywords of intention segment (e.g.,
“safe”) was presented for 2 s after a 300 ms delay. The action
and outcome segments were then presented cumulatively, and
the keywords of the action and outcome segments were presented
in a manner similar to the intention segment keywords. At
the end of the trial, participants were required to judge the
moral permissibility of the agent’s action from 1 (Forbidden) to
7 (Permissible) in Experiment 1, and to judge how much moral
praise the agent deserves for the action from 1 (None at all) to
7 (Very much) in Experiment 2. In both experiments, following
eight practice trials, participants completed 160 test trials and
could take a short break after every 20 trials. The sequence
of stories was pseudo-randomly ordered and no scenario was
repeated in ﬁve consecutive stories.
ERP Recordings
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64
scalp sites using tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap
(NeuroScan Inc.). Reference was placed at vertex by default.
Horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from
electrodes placed at the outer canthi of both eyes. Vertical
EOG was recorded from electrodes placed above and below
the left eye. All interelectrode impedance was maintained
under 5K. EEG and EOG signals were ampliﬁed with a
0.05–100-Hz bandpass ﬁlter and continuously sampled at
500 Hz/channel.
During oﬀ-line analysis, EEG was re-referenced to the
average reference. Ocular artifacts were removed from the
EEG signal using a regression procedure implemented in the
Neuroscan software (Semlitsch et al., 1986). The EEG was
averaged in 1400-ms epochs (200-ms baseline) time-locked to
the presentation of the keywords in the intention segment. These
averages were digitally ﬁltered with a 30-Hz low-pass ﬁlter and
were baseline corrected by subtracting from each sample the
average activity of that channel during the baseline period. Any
trials in which EEG voltages exceeded a threshold of ±80 μV
during the recording epoch were excluded from the analysis.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Permissibility and praise judgments of harm and help scenarios,
respectively, as well as reaction times were analyzed using
separate 2 (intention: valence, neutral) × 2 (outcome: valence,
neutral) repeated measures ANOVA:
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic representation of sample harm (left) and help (right) scenarios. (B) Schematic representation of a single moral judgment trial.
Moral Judgments of Harm Scenarios
For the values of permissibility, the main eﬀects of intention
and outcome were both signiﬁcant. Agents with negative
intentions were judged more non-permissible than those with
neutral intentions [negative, 1.81 ± 0.09; neutral, 4.67 ± 0.17;
F(1,26)= 216.12, p< 0.001, partial η2 = 0.89]. Agents producing
negative outcomes were judged more non-permissible than
those causing neutral outcomes [negative, 2.38 ± 0.11; neutral,
4.09 ± 0.12; F(1,26) = 78.54, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.89].
The interaction between intention and outcome was signiﬁcant
[F(1,26) = 129.56, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.83]. Post hoc tests
showed that the diﬀerence between no harm and accidental harm
was larger than that between attempted harm and successful
harm (no harm, 5.86 ± 0.16; accidental, 3.48 ± 0.20; attempted,
2.32 ± 0.15; successful, 1.29 ± 0.06) (Figure 2).
Moral Judgments of Help Scenarios
Predicted main eﬀects of intention and outcome were observed.
Agents with positive intentions were judged more praiseworthy
than agents with neutral intentions [positive, 5.27 ± 0.18;
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FIGURE 2 | Moral permissibility (left) and praise (right) judgments. Error bars represent standard error.
neutral, 3.31 ± 0.16, F(1,27) = 149.15, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.85]. Agents producing positive outcomes were judged
more praiseworthy than those causing neutral outcomes
[positive, 5.01 ± 0.17; neutral, 3.57 ± 0.15, F(1,27) = 163.37,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.86]. However, there was no signiﬁcant
interaction between intention and outcome [F(1,27) = 0.44,
p = 0.514, partial η2 = 0.02] (Figure 2).
Reaction Time of Harm Scenarios
The main eﬀect of intention was signiﬁcant [F(1,26) = 23.83,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.48]. Judgments of negative intentions
were faster than of neutral intentions (negative, 1628 ± 117 ms;
neutral, 1347 ± 89 ms). The interaction between intention and
outcome was also signiﬁcant [F(1,26) = 41.58, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.62]. Post hoc tests showed that judgments of neutral
outcomes were longer than that of negative outcomes when the
intention of the agent was negative (negative, 1516 ± 110 ms;
neutral, 1177 ± 74 ms). However, when the agent had
neutral intention, the reaction times of neutral outcomes were
signiﬁcantly faster than that of negative outcomes (neutral,
1431 ± 104 ms; negative, 1824 ± 136 ms).
Reaction Time of Help Scenarios
There was a main eﬀect of outcome [F(1,27) = 29.49, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.52] and a signiﬁcant interaction between intention
and outcome [F(1,27) = 25.98, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.49]. Post
hoc tests showed that only when the agents had positive intention,
the judgments were faster for positive outcomes (1281 ± 100 ms)
than neutral outcomes (1799 ± 135 ms). When the agents had
neutral intention, no diﬀerence was found in reaction times
between positive outcomes and neutral outcomes.
ERP Results
ERP Components and Analysis
The grand averaged ERP patterns of harmful and helpful
experiments were similar (see Supplementary Materials).
Following the methodology of previous studies and after
examination of the grand average ERPs, the ERP components
at three areas were selected: frontal area (average amplitudes of
electrodes FPZ, FP1, FP2, AF3, and AF4), left temporo-parietal
area (average amplitudes of electrodes CP5, P3, P5, P7, and
TP7) and right temporo-parietal area (average amplitudes of
electrodes CP6, P4, P6, P8, and TP8). Based on the hypothesis
and visual inspection, two early components and three late
waves were analyzed: two early negative components peaking
from 160 to 210 ms (N180), from 230 to 270 ms (N250) over
bilateral temporo-parital areas; a positive component peaking
between 400 and 500 ms (TP450) and a late slow-wave from
580 to 780 ms (TPSW) over bilateral temporo-parital areas;
and a frontal slow-wave from 380 to 780 ms (FSW) recorded
over frontal area. Figure 3 presents the mean ERPs over frontal
and bilateral temporal-parietal areas during four experimental
conditions.
For the statistical analysis, we analyzed the diﬀerences in ERP
waveforms recorded during the four experimental conditions in
both experiments. At left and right temporo-parietal areas, the
peak amplitudes of N180 and N250 and the mean amplitudes
of TP450 and TPSW were computed. At the frontal area, the
mean amplitude of FSW was computed. For the temporo-
parietal ERP components, amplitudes of each component were
measured by a three-way repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) of 2 (intention: valenced, neutral) × 2 (outcome:
valenced, neutral) × 2 (hemisphere: left, right). For the FSW, a
two-way repeated-measures ANOVA of 2 (intention: valenced,
neutral) × 2 (outcome: valenced, neutral) was conducted. The
Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied to adjust the degrees
of freedom of the F ratios. The statistical results and eﬀects are
listed in Table 1 and Figure 4.
ERP Component Effects
Early ERP eﬀects over TPJ area for harm scenarios
For the N180, the repeated-measures ANOVA only revealed
a three-way interaction [F(1,26) = 4.42, p = 0.045, partial
η2 = 0.15]. Post hoc tests showed that only in the right
hemisphere, the N180 was more negative for successful harm
than attempted harm.
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FIGURE 3 | Grand-averaged ERPs to the same keywords of successful action (green line), attempted failed action (blue line), accidental action (black
line) and neutral action (gray line) conditions over frontal, left and right temporal-parietal areas, from two experiments. Shown next to the waveforms
are the associated scalp distributions of the five differential effects during the 160–210 ms (N180), 230–270 ms (N250), 380—780 ms (FSW), 400–500 ms (TP450),
and 580–780 ms (TPSW) time windows for the difference waves between attempted and successful actions (subtracting ERPs of attempted conditions from
successful conditions).
For the N250, the main eﬀect of hemisphere was signiﬁcant
[F(1,26)= 15.25, p= 0.001, partial η2 = 0.37], with that the N250
amplitude was more negative in the left hemisphere than the
right hemisphere. The three-way interaction was also signiﬁcant
[F(1,26) = 9.65, p = 0.005, partial η2 = 0.27]. Post-hoc tests
showed that only in the left hemisphere, the N250 was more
negative for attempted harm than successful harm.
Early ERP eﬀects over TPJ area for help scenarios
For the N180, the interaction between outcome and hemisphere
was signiﬁcant [F(1,27) = 4.67, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.15].
Most importantly, there was a signiﬁcant three-way interaction
[F(1,27) = 7.95, p = 0.009, partial η2 = 0.23]. Post hoc tests
showed that only in the right hemisphere, the N180 was more
negative for successful help than attempted help.
For the N250, the main eﬀects of outcome and hemisphere
were both signiﬁcant. The N250 was more negative for neutral
outcome than positive outcome [F(1,27) = 5.27, p = 0.03, partial
η2 = 0.16] and was more negative in the left hemisphere than the
right hemisphere [F(1,27) = 9.075, p = 0.006, partial η2 = 0.25].
The interaction between outcome and hemisphere was signiﬁcant
[F(1,27) = 5.142, p = 0.032, partial η2 = 0.16], such that in
the left hemisphere, the N250 was more negative for neutral
outcome than positive outcome. The three-way interaction was
also signiﬁcant, F(1, 27) = 5.83, p = 0.023, partial η2 = 0.18.
Again, only in the left hemisphere, the N250 was more negative
for attempted help than successful help.
Late ERP eﬀects over TPJ area for harm scenarios
For the TP450, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between
intention and hemisphere [F(1,26) = 5.04, p = 0.033, partial
η2 = 0.16], whereby amplitudes were signiﬁcantly larger for
neutral compared with negative trials only in the left hemisphere.
Most importantly, TP450 amplitudes exhibited a three-way
interaction [F(1,26) = 5.47, p = 0.027, partial η2 = 0.17]. Post
hoc tests showed that only in the right hemisphere, the TP450
was larger for attempted harm than successful harm.
For the TPSW, the main eﬀect of intention was signiﬁcant
[F(1,26) = 5.34, p = 0.029, partial η2 = 0.17], indicating
that the TPSW amplitude was more positive for the neutral
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TABLE 1 | Mean amplitudes and 95% confidence intervals for ERP components in harm/help scenarios (µV).
Harm/Help ERP Left/
Right
Successful
M
(95% CI)
Attempted
M
(95% CI)
p Accidental
M
(95% CI)
All-neutral
M
(95% CI)
p
Harm N180 L −3.42
(−4.19,−2.66)
−3.61
(−4.31,−2.91)
0.49 −3.39
(−4.20,−2.58)
−3.53
(−4.36,−2.70)
0.52
R −2.15
(−2.82,−1.48)
−1.54
(−2.20,−0.88)
0.04∗ −1.78
(−2.36,−1.19)
−1.94
(−2.73,−1.15)
0.49
N250 L −2.39
(−3.48,−1.30)
−2.80
(−3.92,−1.67)
0.03∗ −2.71
(−3.80,−1.63)
−2.26
(−3.11,−1.42)
0.08
R −0.80
(−1.64,0.04)
−0.60
(−1.29,0.10)
0.44 −0.44
(−1.09,0.21)
−0.67
(−1.47,0.12)
0.26
TP450 L 0.67
(−0.03,1.37)
0.74
(−0.11,1.60)
0.79 1.18
(0.35,2.00)
1.43
(0.75,2.11)
0.38
R 1.47
(0.81,2.14)
2.17
(1.33,3.02)
0.03∗ 1.91
(1.21,2.61)
1.53
(0.74,2.31)
0.11
TPSW L 0.54
(−0.17,1.24)
0.65
(−0.27,1.57)
0.73 0.72
(−0.15,1.58)
1.07
(0.24,1.90)
0.22
R 0.00
(−0.67,0.68)
0.98
(0.29,1.68)
0.00∗∗ 1.12
(0.53,1.71)
0.39
(−0.38,1.16)
0.01∗∗
FSW / −3.48
(−5.03,−1.93)
−4.65
(−6.41,−2.88)
0.04∗ −4.24
(−5.65,−2.83)
−4.17
(−5.72,−2.61)
0.84
Help N180 L −3.40
(−3.94,−2.86)
−3.72
(−4.36,−3.09)
0.10 −3.08
(−3.51,−2.66)
−3.37
(−3.91,−2.84)
0.08
R −2.41
(−3.08,−1.73)
−1.94
(−2.58,−1.30)
0.00∗∗ −1.97
(−2.54,−1.40)
−2.28
(−2.83,−1.74)
0.16
N250 L −2.58
(−3.15,−2.01)
−3.08
(−3.76,−2.39)
0.00∗∗ −2.52
(−3.06,−1.98)
−2.81
(−3.43,−2.19)
0.18
R −1.84
(−2.60,−1.07)
−1.50
(−2.19,−0.82)
0.11 −1.64
(−2.27,−1.00)
−1.90
(−2.53,−1.27)
0.19
TP450 L 0.91
(0.46,1.37)
0.75
(0.28,1.21)
0.40 0.98
(0.55,1.40)
0.81
(0.45,1.16)
0.29
R 1.47
(0.90,2.04)
2.15
(1.63,2.68)
0.00∗∗∗ 1.53
(0.88,2.19)
1.22
(0.68,1.76)
0.19
TPSW L 0.51
(−0.16,1.17)
−0.07
(−0.65,0.50)
0.03∗ 0.28
(−0.19,0.76)
0.26
(−0.18,0.70)
0.91
R 0.50
(0.01,0.99)
1.01
(0.55,1.46)
0.01∗ 0.57
(0.05,1.09)
0.43
(−0.06,0.91)
0.54
FSW / −2.26
(−3.13,−1.39)
−2.90
(−3.75,−2.04)
0.04∗ −2.47
(-3.42,-1.52)
−2.19
(−2.93,−1.45)
0.33
L, left; R, right; M, mean amplitudes; ∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001; CI, confidence interval.
intention than the negative intention. The interaction between
intention and outcome was signiﬁcant [F(1,26)= 8.79, p= 0.006,
partial η2 = 0.25], indicating that the TPSW amplitude
was more positive for attempted harm than successful harm.
Most importantly, the three-way interaction was signiﬁcant
[F(1,26) = 15.97, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.38]. Post hoc tests
showed that only in the right hemisphere, the TPSW amplitude
was more positive for attempted harm than successful harm and
was more positive for accidental harm than no harm (accidental,
1.12 ± 0.29 μV; no harm, 0.39 ± 0.38 μV).
Late ERP eﬀects over TPJ area for help scenarios
For the TP450, there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of hemisphere,
with the TP450 more positive in the right hemisphere than the
left hemisphere [F(1,27) = 5.88, p = 0.022, partial η2 = 0.18].
The interactions of outcome × hemisphere [F(1,27) = 4.43,
p = 0.045, partial η2 = 0.14] and intention × outcome
[F(1,27) = 5.75, p = 0.024, partial η2 = 0.18] were both
signiﬁcant. Most importantly, the TP450 amplitudes exhibited
a three-way interaction, F(1, 27) = 5.81 p = 0.023, partial
η2 = 0.18. Post hoc tests showed that only in the right hemisphere,
the TP450 was larger for attempted help than successful harm.
For the TPSW, the interaction between outcome and
hemisphere was signiﬁcant, F(1,27) = 6.47, p = 0.017, partial
η2 = 0.19. Most importantly, the three-way interaction was also
signiﬁcant, F(1,27) = 6.98, p = 0.014, partial η2 = 0.21. Post hoc
tests showed that in the left hemisphere, the TPSW was more
positive for successful help than attempted help. In contrast, in
the right hemisphere, the TPSWwas more positive for attempted
help than successful help.
Late ERP eﬀects over frontal area for harm scenarios
For the FSW, there was a signiﬁcant interaction of
intention × outcome [F(1,26) = 4.98, p = 0.035, partial
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FIGURE 4 | Mean amplitudes of the N180, N250, TP450 and TPSW recorded from selected left and right TPJ electrodes, and mean amplitudes of the
FSW recorded from selected prefrontal electrodes for the four experimental conditions in harmful (left) and helpful (right) moral judgments. Error bars
represent standard error. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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η2 = 0.16]. Post hoc tests showed that the FSW amplitude was
more negative for attempted harm than successful harm.
Late ERP eﬀects over frontal area for help scenarios
Similar to the harmful experiment, there was a signiﬁcant
interaction of intention × outcome of the FSW, F(1,27) = 6.86,
p = 0.014, partial η2 = 0.20. Post hoc tests showed that the FSW
was more negative for attempted help than successful help.
DISCUSSION
One aim of the present study was to examine ERP responses
to keywords integrating the information of harmful/helpful
intention and outcome in moral judgment. The ERPs were time-
locked to the keywords of intention. In each trial, the foreshadow
information actually have implied the possible outcome of the
agent’s action. So, when the keyword of intention was presented,
subjects not just decoded but also integrated the intention with
outcome information. This integration processing has lead to the
signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between intention and outcome in
previous studies (Young et al., 2007, 2011; Young and Saxe, 2008)
and in the present study. Consistent with our hypothesis, the
ERPs showed diﬀerences between conditions in early and late
time windows over prefrontal and temporo-parietal electrodes.
We presume that these frontal and bilateral temporo-parietal
eﬀects reﬂect, at least in part, the participants’ online processing
of the integration of intention and outcome information to make
moral judgments.
During early time windows, two negative ERP components,
N180 and N250, over bilateral temporo-parietal areas were
found. These components diﬀerentiated between successful
and attempted conditions in both experiments. Because the
keywords of intention in these two conditions were the
same, diﬀerences in ERP activities cannot be attributed to
physical diﬀerences between stimuli but rather to the mental
processes. During the time window from 160 to 210 ms, the
successful harm/help conditions induced more negative N180
than attempted conditions. This early eﬀect was consistent
with the fast automatic reaction to moral valence information
found in previous studies (Van Berkum et al., 2009; Decety
and Cacioppo, 2012; Yoder and Decety, 2014; Gui et al., 2015).
Yoder and Decety (2014) reported the amplitude diﬀerences
on N1 component between morally good and bad actions.
In our previous study, we found that the N1 amplitudes
elicited by moral pictures were signiﬁcantly more negative
than those elicited by non-moral pictures and suggested that
this early ERP eﬀect reﬂected the moral intuition processing
without the emotional impact (Gui et al., 2015). By using
high-density ERP techniques, Decety and Cacioppo (2012)
found that people could distinguish between intentional and
accidental harm in as fast as 62 ms post-stimulus. Van Berkum
et al. (2009) reported a rapid ERP response to the ﬁrst word
that indicates a clash with the reader’s value system within
200 ms. According to the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001),
when dealing with the information about morals, people would
automatically give harsher evaluations to moral transgressors
and more favorable evaluations to those who uphold moral
standards. In the conditions of successful harm and help, the
agent kills or saves a human life intentionally and successfully.
Subjects may have a quick, automatic evaluations to give harsher
punishment to violators and bigger reward to people who
behave morally. This kind of rapid, automatic reaction may be
reﬂected by the more negative N180 of successful conditions in
both experiments. In other words, the condition of successful
harm was more morally “bad” than the condition of attempted
but failed harm, and the actions with higher moral valence
induced more negative N180 amplitude. In the same way,
the successful help condition induced larger N180 because
this condition was more morally “good” than the attempted
help condition. These eﬀects only reached signiﬁcance over
right temporo-parietal areas, which were consistent with many
previous ﬁndings: ERP studies have found signiﬁcant activity in
right TPJ during spontaneous trait inference and spontaneous
goal inference processing (Van Duynslaeger et al., 2007; Van
der Cruyssen et al., 2009). FMRI studies also reported that
right TPJ contributes more to moral intuition than moral
deliberation (Young and Saxe, 2009; Harenski et al., 2010). In
a word, the eﬀect of the N180 demonstrated a rapid response
over right temporo-parietal electrodes to morally extreme
information.
Over the left hemisphere, there was an early negative
component peaking at 250 ms, which was named as N250.
Diﬀerent from the N180 eﬀects, the N250 of attempted
conditions were more negative than that of successful conditions.
This eﬀect was consistent with previous ERP ﬁndings: One
ERP study showed that decoding mental states from pictures
of eyes induced a negative component which started 270 ms
post-stimulus (Sabbagh et al., 2004). Another study reported
a larger amplitude of N250 over parietal electrodes for
private intention compared to communicative and physical
intentions and suggested that N250 was related to the early
cognitive processing of intention information (Wang et al.,
2012). Proverbio and Riva (2009), Proverbio et al. (2010)
found that pictures of comprehensible behaviors induced larger
posterior N250 compared to incomprehensible behaviors and
suggested that this component reﬂected the recognition and
comprehension processing of action intention. Besides, the
N250 eﬀect only reached signiﬁcance over left temporo-parietal
electrodes. Previous studies showed that left TPJ may be indexing
diﬀerences in generic perspective processing during mentalizing
(Perner et al., 2006; Young et al., 2011). Based on these results,
we suggest the N250 eﬀect might reﬂect the early representation
and integration processing of moral intention and outcome
information.
During late time windows, two late waves, TP450 and
TPSW, over bilateral temporo-parietal electrodes and one
slow wave, FSW, over frontal electrodes diﬀerentiated between
conditions, especially between attempted and successful
harm/help conditions. Over right temporo-parietal area, the
positive component during the 400–500 ms time window
(TP450) appeared and was exceptionally large for attempted
harm/help conditions. This component has been demonstrated
as an index of complex mental state processing in a previous
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TOM study and the activity of right TPJ could account for most
of its variance (McCleery et al., 2011). In the present study,
the signiﬁcant interaction of intention × outcome on TP450
over right hemisphere might reﬂect the complex integration
processing of intention and outcome information.
The TPSW component, in the later time window from 580
to 780 ms, not only distinguished between the attempted and
successful harm/help conditions over right hemisphere, but also
between no harm and accidental harm in Experiment 1 and
between attempted help and successful help over left hemisphere
in Experiment 2. Similar late positive components had been
reported in many previous ERP studies, which were speciﬁcally
associated with belief processing (Liu et al., 2009; Geangu et al.,
2013). Over prefrontal area, consistent with previous studies, a
slow wave from 380 to 780 ms (FSW) was found, which was
larger in the attempted harm/help conditions than successful
harm/help conditions. Frontal ERP eﬀects have been found
and were related to the mental states processing and inhibitory
control in many previous studies (Chen et al., 2009; Liu et al.,
2009; McCleery et al., 2011; Geangu et al., 2013). Here, our results
suggested that the prefrontal activity started from 380 ms after
stimulus presentation and the prefrontal eﬀects were paralleled
by similar ﬁndings at the temporo-parietal area, which have been
speciﬁcally associated with diﬀerentiating and reasoning between
conditions.
Another aim of this study was to explore the cognitive
mechanism and neural temporal dynamics of integration of
helpful intention and outcome. For the behavioral results,
unlike in the harm context, we did not ﬁnd the signiﬁcant
interaction between intention and outcome but only the main
eﬀects of these two factors. For the ERP results, in the help
experiment, signiﬁcant outcome × hemisphere interactive eﬀects
were found for N180, N250, TP450 and TPSW components,
while these did not reach signiﬁcance in the harm experiment.
We suggest two possible reasons to explain these diﬀerences
between helpful and harmful judgment. One reason is that
in help scenarios, the importance of the outcome factor was
greater, which neutralized the interactive eﬀect between intention
and outcome. Error management theory suggest that when
people make a judgment (for instance, judge whether sticks
are snakes or not), they can make either a false-positive error
(inferring that it is a snake when it is actually not) or a
false-negative error (inferring that it is not a snake when it
actually is). People more often make the false-positive error
because the cost of this kind of error is less over evolutionary
time (Haselton and Buss, 2000; Haselton and Nettle, 2006). In
the attempted and accidental help conditions of the present
study, agents in the described stories either have positive
intents to help others, or their actions have lead to positive
consequences. According to this theory, although agents in these
two conditions have made false-positive errors, subjects still
gave them more favorable evaluations, which may neurtralize
the interaction of intention and outcome in helpful condition.
Another reason is the diﬀerences between the tasks. In the
help contexts, we asked participants to judge how much moral
praise the agent deserves, but in the harm condition, the task
was to judge the moral permissibility of the agent’s action.
Diﬀerent question types could induce diﬀerent psychological
processing for moral judgments (Christensen and Gomila,
2012). When participants were asked for the permissibility
of a moral transgression, they appeared to base primarily
on intention information. However, for the assignment of
praise and blame, both mental states and the causal link
between the agent’s actions and the harmful consequences is
important (Cushman, 2008). A similar asymmetry between
moral judgment of good and bad has been reported in a
previous study: for the negative impulsive actions elicited a
discounting of moral blame, but the positive impulsive actions
did not elicit a discounting of moral praise (Pizarro et al.,
2003).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study using
ERPs to assess the temporal dynamics of integration processing
of intention and outcome in harmful and helpful moral judgment
contexts. The ﬁndings suggest that the neural mechanism of
the integration processing of moral intention and outcome may
involve three stages. The ﬁrst stage involves a fast response
over right temporo-parietal area, reﬂected in our ﬁnding that
successful harm/help conditions induced more negative N180
than attempted harm/help conditions. The second stage involves
representation of intention information and early integration
processing over left temporo-parietal area, indicated by the
larger N250 for attempted harm/help conditions. The third stage
involves late integration and reasoning processing over prefrontal
and temporo-parietal areas, reﬂected by the TP450, TPSW and
FSW eﬀects.
There are some limitations of the present study. First,
when the intention keyword was presented, before completing
the integration process, participants might have encoded the
intention information ﬁrst. Future studies should manipulate
the sequence of intention and outcome presentation to clearly
separate these two diﬀerent processing phases. Second, as
the stories in harmful moral scenarios were adopted from
previous fMRI studies (Young et al., 2007, 2010, 2011), the
background information in some stories might give readers
a clue about the tendency of the agent’s intention before the
intention keyword was presented to them (e.g., Because the
white powder is labeled “sugar,” Grace believes that it is “safe”).
However, we have found similar patterns of ERP components
in judgments about helpful moral scenarios when we keep the
information constant across diﬀerent conditions of the same
scenarios, so the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in early N180 component
between conditions with the same moral keywords might not
be attributed to those intention clue diﬀerences in background
information. Anyway, further studies are still required to obtain a
purer intention component when investigating related questions.
Finally, the present study demonstrated that prefrontal and
temporo-parietal activities could reﬂect the processing of the
integration of intention and outcome. However, the spatial
resolution of ERP technique is not high enough. Future
studies should use high-density electrical techniques combined
with fMRI to identify the source of these ERP components
more accurately, which would be a meaningful contribution
to the understanding of the neural mechanisms of moral
judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Our ﬁndings suggested a possible time course of neural activation
during integration of moral intention and outcome, starting
from the right temporo-parietal area, more negative N180 of
successful harm/help conditions reﬂected a rapid intuitionist
response in the earliest time window. Then the larger N250 for
attempted harm/help over left temporo-parietal area implied the
representation and early integration processing. The late ERP
eﬀects (FSW, TP450 and TPSW) implied the integration and
reasoning processing over frontal and bilateral temporo-parietal
areas in late time window. These results highlighted the critical
role of neural activation over right temporo-parietal areas in
both early automatic responses to moral actions and late moral
integration processing.
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